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Abstract  
Objectives; The accumulation and usefulness of clinical data have increased with IT 
development. While using clinical data that needs to be identifiable to obtain meaningful 
information, it is essential to ensure that data is de-identified and unnecessary clinical 
information is minimized to protect personal information. This process requires criteria and an 
appropriate method as there are clear identifiers as well as quasi-identifiers that are not readily 
identifiable.   
Methods; To formulate such a method, first, primary quasi-identifiers were selected by 
classifying information in 20 clinical personal information database tables into Direct-
Identifier (DID), Quasi-Identifier (QI), Sensitive Attribute (SA), and Non-Sensitive Attribute 
(NSA) according to its type. Secondary QIs were then selected by assessing the risk for outliers 
by measuring uniqueness values of the selected data and scoring re-identification by calculating 
equivalence class of the influence on other data on QI removal. Third, the risk of re-
identification of data users was numeralized and classified. Lastly, the final QI according to 
user class was determined by comparing the calculated re-identification scores to the threshold 
values of user classes.  
Results; Eventually, final QIs ranging from a minimum of 18 to a maximum of 28 were selected 
by making an assumption about user classes and using it as criteria. 
Conclusions; The QI selection method presented by the current investigators can be used by 
researchers at the final checkup stage before they de-identify the selected QIs. Therefore, 
clinical data users can securely and efficiently use clinical data containing personal information 
by objectively selecting QIs using the method proposed in the present study. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The big data industry has made it possible to perform analyses in various areas; however, the 
industry is now able to provide individualized services to information users by converging and 
utilizing each individual’s data. Therefore, although the value of data utilization has increased, 
the risk of loss of personal information has increased as well.[1, 2]  
Medical data include various medical records and results based on the actions taken with regard 
to the treatment of an individual at a hospital such as basic information about the patient, 
pathology, admission, discharge, and surgery information. In addition, medical data also 
include sensitive personal information such as disease codes and surgery history. Therefore, 
de-identification must be performed prior to using medical data for non-medical purposes.[3] 
De-identification is a process used to make the subject of the information unidentifiable. 
Personally identifiable information such as name and resident registration number are included 
in information that can identify an individual.[4]  
Medical data can be classified in the context of de-identification into Direct-Identifier (DID), 
Quasi-Identifier (QI), Sensitive Attribute (SA), and Non-Sensitive Attribute (NSA). DID refers 
to data that enable direct identification of a target individual such as name, social security 
number, and e-mail address. In the United States, Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy rules regulate the utilization of medical information and 
selection of DID type based on laws related to the personal information protection.[5, 6] 
Because such DIDs reveal identity without any other additional information, de-identification 
measures are taken to prevent identification by either removing the value corresponding to the 
selected DID or by applying predetermined rules.[7]  
QI is defined as the information that can identify an individual when combined with other 
categories of information even though they are not a DID. It is also important personal 
information that requires the same level of processing as a DID. A large amount of data loss 
will occur if the information classified as QI is de-identified, and the data that can be used for 
actual analysis will be greatly reduced. Accordingly, selecting QIs appropriately and providing 
information that is actually needed for data analysis are important issues associated with de-
identification.[8] 
Because no exact criteria have been defined for de-identification until now, QIs are selected by 
subjective judgments stemming from the experience of the person in charge. In addition, QI 
selection is inconsistent because it is de-identified based on different criteria. When such data 
are collated, there is a possibility of the identity of the information subject being revealed by 
privacy attacks such as linkage attacks.[9] On the other hand, the QIs selected based on the 
guidelines for de-identification of personal information comply with criteria for the prevention 
of information re-identification. Therefore, a QI selection method needs to be established with 
consideration to using medical data, distribution range, and QI characteristics given that data 
utility will be reduced owing to most of the data being suppressed if all defined example items 
are selected as QIs and de-identified.[10, 11] 
The QI related research mostly proposed so far has involved comparing and analyzing target 
data, and based on the outcome, data on new de-identification targets is suggested. Research 
conducted until now, however, also has limitations in that there was obscure standard, and de-
identification methods judged to be the most appropriate were subjectively suggested.  
Therefore, we attempt to suggest a methodology that can objectively specify QIs within the 
scope of clinical data. The proposed methodology can minimize the danger of information 
leakage when used for research by identifying connections in data based on the risk of exposing 
information when data is collated and minimize data loss through de-identification processes. 
 1.1 Background  
 
The information that can identify an individual by itself should be eliminated. In addition, risks 
due to combining with other information should be minimized. It means that de-identification 
may be needed to accomplish the analysis goal in the case that obtaining consent for analyzing 
retained personal information is difficult. Considering the risk of information re-identification, 
management and post management of de-identification should be thorough.[5, 6]  
Fundamentally, de-identification technologies assume the risk of re-identification. The level of 
risk is considered to differ depending on the de-identification method applied. Various 
elements are included, but the level of specific data linked to a particular individual is one of 
the most basic elements. From this perspective, the risk of personal information infringed upon 
due to the identification of applicable information varies depending on whether the data are 
linked to a specific individual, whether there is a potential possibility of data linking to a 
specific individual, or whether the data can possibly be linked to a loosely defined group of 
people instead of a specific individual.[7, 12]  
A comparison of de-identification related studies in the last five years reveals significant 
progress in the de-identification research on clinical information. Studies so far on various de-
identification methods have primarily focused on avoiding linkage attacks.[1, 13-16] They 
have mostly researched methods to minimize the identifiability of individuals from combining 
pieces of information by strengthening de-identification methods. Furthermore, such research 
methods have been focused on retrospective studies that use data from clinical information.[17-
26] The reason is that it is easy to be exposed to the risk of re-identification in the process of 
reusing data.[2] Although the risk of data re-identification can be reduced with such research 
methods, the possibility of reducing data utility also exists.[7] Consequently, research should 
be conducted on maintaining the value of data through studies on procedures for the selection 
of QIs, which are the targets of de-identification. Even though there have been studies dealing 
with QIs, they simply treat QIs as targets for de-identification, and research on selecting data 
as QIs based on specific criteria has not been conducted. Accordingly, taking this research 
background into consideration, the present study aims to investigate data utility and 
minimization of re-identification risk by selecting QIs using specific criteria only from clinical 
data for retrospective studies.  
  
2. Methods 
 
2.1 De-identification analysis targets 
 
De-identification analysis was performed on Electronic Medical Record (EMR), which was 
built in National Cancer Center in Korea, as source data. The EMR is composed of 6,761 tables 
containing four types of clinical data: clinical code, prescription and results, patient information, 
and registration. Experiments were conducted on 17 tables that did have personal information. 
Additionally, even though death-related information is not personal information according to 
the act for personal information protection, 3 tables containing death-related information were 
added since it is included in the review as information to be protected.  
 
2.2 Final QI selection process 
 
We use the scores of the user who analyzes the data for research such as retrospective study 
and the institution with which the user is affiliated as the criterion for selecting QIs to identify 
the objective balance between re-identification risk and data utility. The items known to be 
elements that can identify an individual were first selected as QIs by combining them with 
other information according to the HIPAA rules.[5] The calculation of uniqueness and 
influence values is described at step 2. The final QIs were selected for the digitized columns 
based on the QI selection criteria established using the scores for the user and institution. Figure 
1 shows the process carried out to select the final QIs.  
 
 Figure 1. Process of QI decision by possibility of data linkage, analysis of re-identification 
possibility in organization, understanding of user, and possibility of re-identification. 
 
Step 1. Primary QI selection according to the de-identification guidelines 
 
Selection of QIs aims not only to safely use data but also to obtain data that must be de-
identified to use in research. Accordingly, de-identification of QIs is subjected to different 
criteria depending on the purpose of research, unlike DIDs that require compulsory deletion 
for de-identification. In addition, the sensitive data included in clinical data must also be 
deleted in principle if they are irrelevant to the purpose of data use. Therefore, the first step in 
the de-identification process is classifying data columns into DID, QI, SA, and NSA.[6] The 
data column classification process is indicated in Figure 2. If the information is not a DID and 
a specific individual cannot be identified using the information but can be easily identified by 
combining it with other information such as personal, physical, and credit characteristics, the 
information is classified as a QI. If an individual is identified using information that is not a 
DID or QI, sensitive information that can inflict ethical, financial, and reputational harm upon 
an individual is classified into an SA, and other general information is classified into an NSA.  
 
 Figure 2. Process of classification by data column for de-identification. DID: direct-
identification; QI: quasi-identification; SA: sensitive attribute; NSA: non-sensitive attribute. 
 
 
Step 2. Secondary QI selection based on re-identifiability scores 
 
 
Figure 3. Example of calculation rules of uniqueness (A) and influence (B).  
The QIs are selected based on identifiability scores determined by identifying the 
characteristics of the data. Uniqueness was calculated for each column, since a column with a 
large number of unique values can be considered to have a high possibility of re-identification 
(Figure 3A).[27] For example, the uniqueness of a column means the calculated ratio of unique 
records, i.e., The ratio of a record with only one value to all the records in the column. Therefore, 
because 58 and 64 are unique values among the five values in each column in the cases of 
weight and age, respectively, they have a uniqueness value of 0.2 each. If the uniqueness value 
is 0, the information cannot identify a specific individual, implying that it does not have to be 
selected as a QI because of its low data risk. On the other hand, a column that has a non-zero 
uniqueness value implies that it has at least one distinct value. Such a column can be considered 
to have re-identification risk because the distinct value can be key to identifying a specific 
individual. 
Next, the level of influence is measured based on changes in the number of equivalence classes 
(Figure 3B). NE denotes the number of equivalence classes in a data set, T is the sum of all 
columns in the table, and Ci denotes the ith column. If the number of equivalence classes 
decreases sharply compared to the number of equivalence classes of the entire table when a 
specific column is excluded, then the level of influence of the specific column on the data is 
high. In Figure 3A, even though the uniqueness values of weight and age are the same, the high 
influence of age can be seen if the ratio of the number of equivalence classes in each column 
to that in the entire table is calculated. Because the number of equivalence classes of the entire 
table is four while it is three when the age column is excluded, the influence value of age is 
0.25. A column with an influence value indicates that it can increase the risk of re-identification 
by increasing the number of equivalence classes due to its influence on other columns, even if 
its uniqueness value is 0. Therefore, it is selected as a QI, which has the possibility of 
identifying individuals by combining with other data. 
Lastly, among the primary QIs, the QIs that have uniqueness and influence values calculated 
above are selected as the secondary QIs and scored as the sum of uniqueness and influence to 
use them as re-identifiability scores. 
 
Step 3. User and institution grading based on scoring the possibility of data 
linkage 
 
 The final QI selection reflects the risk of data re-identification through a survey of the 
institution and users using the data. First, scoring is carried out by assigning weights based on 
the characteristics of the institution to prevent identification of specific individuals with data 
QIs provided through the data institutions have by classifying institutions that use data. Second, 
scoring is performed after weightings are assigned to the possibility of re-identification by 
assessing it and the ability to protect the personal information of data users. Lastly, scoring is 
performed based on the data user’s ability to protect personal information. Lastly, the re-
identification of data is scored. Table 1 shows an example of indices that can be scored on the 
possibility of data linkage. Institutions and enterprises using clinical research data assign 
weights according to the ease of collecting data related to the applicable data and score. In the 
case of public institutions, gradings are carried out with differentiation so that institutions that 
engage significantly with clinical data such as the National Health Insurance Service, the 
Health Insurance Review & Assessment Service, and Public Hospitals are graded high; 
institutions that engage relatively lesser such as the Ministry of Health & Welfare and the 
Ministry of Food and Drug Safety are graded middle, and other institutions that engage the 
least are graded low. Among enterprises, hospitals, which have high relevance to clinical data, 
are graded high; pharmaceutical companies, which have relatively low relevance are graded 
middle; and other enterprises are graded low. To differentiate the grades determined above, 
scores of ten, five, and one are assigned to high, middle, and low grades, respectively. 
 
Table 1. Probability example of data linkage 
Categorization Institution Probability Grade 
Public 
Institution 
National Health Insurance Service, Health 
Insurance Review & Assessment Service, Public 
Hospital, etc. 
High High 
Ministry of Health & Welfare, Ministry of Food 
and Drug Safety, etc. 
Middle Mid 
Government Agency and so on Low Low 
General 
Enterprise 
Hospital High High 
Pharmaceutical Company Middle Mid 
Enterprise and so on Low Low 
 
Re-identifiability was divided into user such as researcher for retrospective study, and clinical 
data aspects to assess the re-identifiability of institutions. For the user aspect, users’ intent and 
ability to re-identify clinical research data are measured. For the data aspect, the level of 
privacy information protection such as procedures to protect data itself are measured and scored. 
Table 2 is a summary of detailed indicators of re-identification intent of the user aspect and the 
possibility of external data linkage of the data aspect. For re-identification intent, the possible 
impact of re-identified data using Yes/No. For the possibility of external data linkage, the 
possibility of users linking external information to re-identify is assessed using Yes/No. The 
total score is obtained by summing the number of "Yes" responses with one point assigned for 
each response and the maximum score being four points as there are four indicators. The higher 
the score, the higher the intent and ability for re-identification.  
 
Table 2. Intention of re-identification and ability analysis1 
Classification Detailed Indicator Evaluation 
Intention of re-
identification 
Data frame that aims to shames individuals 
when data users or consumers re-identify the data 
Yes/No 
Data frame that offers monetary benefits 
when data users or consumers re-identify the data 
Yes/No 
Data users or requestors who do not communicate about 
the prohibition of re-identification and restriction of data 
provision to third party in data usage (provision) related 
contract 
Yes/No 
Possibility of 
external data 
linkage 
Data that is combinable with the evaluation-target data 
available on the Internet, SNS, and data.go.kr (government 
open-data portal) 
Yes/No 
 
Table 3 summarizes the detailed indicators used to assess the level of privacy information 
protection. It should be noted that the indicators are used to measure the risk for protection 
level, and the number of “No” assessments should be summed. Accordingly, the higher score 
the score, the lower is the protection level. The maximum score is six points.  
 
Table 2. Estimation of privacy information protection 
Classification Detailed Indicator Evaluation 
Ability in 
privacy 
protection 
Receiving security service level agreement or providing 
security training to human resources who can access the 
data 
Yes/No 
Establishing or operating management plan about keeping 
and treating data for users or requestors 
Yes/No 
Data is transferred through a safe method that is physically 
and technologically protected 
Yes/No 
It is used on a server or PC with both systems of intrusion 
blocking and intrusion prevention installed 
Yes/No 
Managing the access authorization and access records of 
human resources that can access data 
Yes/No 
Data users or requestors undergo periodic security check 
from security management division 
Yes/No 
 
The scores for re-identification intent are digitized by adding assessment scores in Tables 2 
and 3. The obtained score is a re-identifiability index and the higher the score, the higher the 
risk of re-identification , implying that data protection should be strengthened.  
 
Users’ understanding of data such as clinical data for research is measured separately for the 
relevant knowledge of data users and length of employment. For the relevant knowledge, users’ 
understanding of data is assessed and scored by analyzing their role and responsibilities (R&R), 
major, and academic degree. For the items on length of employment, given the background 
knowledge on work, it is considered that the longer the length of employment, the higher the 
re-identification risk. Table 4 shows the classification of user’s ability and explanation on 
detailed indicators. The relevant knowledge is assessed as Yes/No, and the length of 
employment is scored. One point is assigned to “Yes” on the detailed items related to relevant 
knowledge, with the maximum score being three points. Items related to the length of 
employment were scored by assigning zero point for less than three years of employment, three 
points for a period between more than three years and less than seven years, five points for a 
period between more than seven years and less than ten years, and seven points for ten years 
or more. Users’ understanding of data was scored by summing the scores of relevant knowledge 
and length of employment. The higher the score, the higher the risk of user’s re-identification, 
and the greater the need for strengthening data protection.  
 
Table 3. User understanding about data 
Classification Detailed Indicator Evaluation 
Relevant 
knowledge 
Data users or requestors have knowledge or relevant 
degrees indicating the ability to re-identify private 
information 
Yes/No 
Data users or requestors can possess or obtain resources 
(money) that can be used to re-identify private information 
Yes/No 
Data users or requestors can access other databases that 
can be linked for the re-identification of private information 
Yes/No 
Working 
period 
Working period of data users or requestors is less than 3 
years 
0 pts 
Working period of data users or requestors is 3 or more 
years but less than 7 years 
3 pts 
Working period of data users or requestors is 7 or more 
years but less than 10 years 
5 pts 
Working period of data users or requestors is 10 or more 
years 
7 pts 
 
The average of the scores of the possibility of data linkage, analysis of the re-identifiability of 
institutions, and users’ understanding of data is obtained. The average value is entered as 
Average Score, and grade is calculated. The average scores are classified into “High” for seven 
points or higher, “Middle” for a score higher than four points but less than seven points, and 
“Low” for less than four points. For example, assuming ten points for the possibility of data 
linkage, five points for re-identifiability, and five points for users’ understanding of data, the 
Average Score of institution and users is 6.67, which is classified as “Middle” (Table 5). 
 
Table 4. Example of calculation for organization and user 
Probability of data 
linkage 
Possibility analysis of 
organization re-
identification 
User understanding 
Average 
score 
10* 2** 8*** 
6.67 
(Middle) 
* The score is obtained from the contents of Table 1, and the score ranges from a minimum of one point to a maximum of ten points. 
** The score is obtained from the contents of Tables 2 and 3, and the score ranges from a minimum of one point to a maximum of ten 
points. 
*** The score is obtained from the contents of Table 4, and the score ranges from a minimum of one point to a maximum of ten points. 
 
Step 4 Final QI selection considering re-identifiability scores and the possibility 
of data linkage 
 
To differentiate the selection criteria for the final QIs depending on the users using data and 
their affiliated institutions, the final QI selection is determined for the re-identifiability of 
scores calculated in Step 3 based on the calculated threshold according to the extracted grade. 
A threshold value of data identifiability of 0.25 is assigned for “High” grade, 0.5 for “Middle” 
grade, and 0.75 for “Low” grade respectively. Only the columns that scored higher re-
identifiability than the applicable thresholds are selected as QIs. The lower the grade, the higher 
the threshold, which results in less number of QIs being selected.  
3. Results  
The clinical data set tables were classified into DIDs, QIs, SAs, and NSAs according to the 
existing HIPAA rules. Table 6 indicates the classification status of the 20 CRDW tables, which 
were classified into 108 DIDs, 137 QIs, 68 SAs, and 460 NSAs. The number of classified DIDs, 
QIs, SAs, and NSAs includes duplicate counts. 
 
Table 6. Analysis results of clinical data set tables by National Cancer Center 
No Description  DID QI SA NSA 
1 Patient master  4 9 5 10 
2 Physical measurement information  7 11 0 12 
3 Patient mortality information  1 1 4 4 
4 Patient mortality date information  1 1 0 4 
5 Patient mortality cause information  1 0 4 4 
6 Therapeutic radiation therapy  12 10 0 27 
7 Processing prescription details  4 6 0 22 
8 Blood transfusion prescription details  4 12 0 37 
9 Details of rehabilitation treatment  6 8 0 27 
10 Reading results TA  1 1 0 43 
11 Pathological reading results  1 1 0 6 
12 Results of pathology readings  10 6 3 21 
13 Surgical prescription details  6 11 0 28 
14 Image function test results  15 5 0 15 
15 Medication prescription details  4 7 6 61 
16 Diagnostic test results  3 3 4 30 
17 Test prescription details  4 6 0 34 
18 Diagnostic information  6 8 0 16 
19 Visit information  10 3 0 22 
20 Early assessment of nursing (General adult)  8 28 42 37 
 
In the 108 columns classified into DID among the 20 tables, the DIDs associated with patients 
are patient names, town-level addresses, and patient identification numbers. In addition, the 
DIDs related to hospital personnel were doctor ID, doctor name, therapist ID, therapist name, 
anesthesiologist ID, anesthesiologist name, initial keyboarder, and final amender.  
Of the 137 columns selected as QIs, the columns with uniqueness scores and influence were 
considered as re-identifiable columns, and the first batch of 64 QIs including duplicates were 
selected. Table 7 illustrates the method of making final QI selections for the applicable columns 
based on the threshold values graded using objective scores for the users and institutions 
mentioned above. First, re-identifiability was scored by summing the uniqueness scores and 
influence scores of each column. From the obtained scores, 28 columns were selected as QIs if 
the threshold was set at 0.25 and by taking columns that have re-identifiability score of 0.25 or 
higher as QIs in the case of “High” user and institution grading. A total of 20 columns were 
selected as QIs if the threshold was set at 0.5 and by taking columns with re-identifiability 
score of 0.5 or higher as QIs in the case of “High” user and institution grading. Lastly, 17 
columns were selected as QIs if the threshold was set at 0.75 and by taking columns with re-
identifiability score of 0.75 or higher as QIs in the case of “High” user and institution grading 
 
Table 7.  The list of selected columns in CRDW 
 
No Table description Column description Uniqueness Influence Sum 
(Uniqueness
+Influence) 
QI 
(0.25+/ 
check) 
QI 
(0.5+/ 
check) 
QI 
(0.75+/ 
check) 
No Table description Column description Uniqueness Influence Sum 
(Uniqueness
+Influence) 
QI 
(0.25+/ 
check) 
QI 
(0.5+/ 
check) 
QI 
(0.75+/
check) 
6 Therapeutic radiation 
therapy 
Gender 0 0.0008 0.0008 
   
13 Surgical prescription 
details 
Medical charge code 0.0003 0 0.0003 
   
Date of birth 0.0000 0.6494 0.6494 O O 
 
Medical charge name(English) 0.0003 0 0.0003 
   
Age at the prescription 0 0.0748 0.0748 
   
Medical charge name(Korea) 0.0003 0 0.0003 
   
Therapeutic site code 0 0.1401 0.1401 
   
14 Image function test 
results 
Gender 0 0.2927 0.2927 O 
  
7 Processing prescription 
details 
Gender 0 1 1 O O O Date of birth 0.0003 0.9994 0.9997 O O O 
Date of birth 0.0000 0.9947 0.9947 O O O Age at the examination 0 0.8670 0.8670 O O O 
Age at the prescription 0 1 1 O O O 15 Medication 
prescription details 
Gender 0 0.0663 0.0663 
   
Prescription type code 0 1 1 O O O Date of birth 0.0001 0.9757 0.9758 O O O 
Prescription code 0.0000 0.9997 0.9997 O O O Age at the examination 0 0.4918 0.4918 O 
  
Medical charge code 0.0000 0.9997 0.9997 O O O Prescription code 0 0.0025 0.0025 
   
8 Blood transfusion 
prescription details 
Gender 0 0.0135 0.0135 
   
Medical charge code 0 0.0195 0.0195 
   
Date of birth 0.0095 0.8194 0.8289 O O O Medical charge code(English) 0 0.4085 0.4085 O 
  
Age at the prescription 0 0.2026 0.2026 
   
Medical charge code(Korea) 0.0000 0.6785 0.6785 O O 
 
Prescription code 0 0.0110 0.0110 
   
16 Diagnostic 
examination results 
Gender 0 0.3070 0.3070 O 
  
Operation name 0.0077 0.0189 0.0266 
   
Date of birth 0.0000 0.9994 0.9994 O O O 
Blood type 0 0.0082 0.0082 
   
Age at the examination 0.0000 0.8680 0.8680 O O O 
9 Details of rehabilitation 
treatment 
Gender 0 0.0035 0.0035 
   
17 Examination 
prescription details 
Gender 0.0009 0.0749 0.0758 
   
Date of birth 0.0027 0.8187 0.8214 O O O Date of birth 0 0.0061 0.0061 
   
Age at the prescription 0 0.1348 0.1348 
   
Age at the prescription 0 0.0005 0.0005 
   
Rehabilitation code 0 0.5190 0.5190 O O 
 
Prescription type code 0 0.0013 0.0013 
   
12 Results of pathology 
readings 
Gender 0 0.0359 0.0359 
   
Prescription code 0 0.0288 0.0288 
   
Date of birth 0.0014 0.7914 0.7928 O O O 18 Diagnostic 
information 
Date of birth 0.0041 0.7602 0.7643 O O O 
Age at the examination 0 0.3000 0.3000 O 
  
Gender 0 0.0100 0.0100 
   
Inspection classification code 0 0.0010 0.0010 
   
Age of diagnosis 0 0.0744 0.0744 
   
Main sampling site 0.0433 0.3096 0.3529 O 
  
Clinical diagnosis(ICD-10th code) 0.0054 0 0.0054 
   
13 Surgical prescription 
details 
Gender 0 0.0011 0.0011 
   
Disease code(ICD-10th) 0.0028 0 0.0028 
   
Date of birth 0.0197 0.7075 0.7272 O O 
 
Disease name(English,ICD-10th) 0.0021 0 0.0021 
   
Age at the prescription 0 0.0490 0.0490 
   
Disease name(Korea,ICD-10th) 0.0019 0 0.0019 
   
Operation code 0.0048 0.0403 0.0451 
   
19 Visit information Date of birth 0.0003 0.9995 0.9998 O O O 
Operation name(English) 0.0025 0 0.0025 
   
Gender 0 0.3272 0.3272 O 
  
Operation name(Korea) 0.0003 0 0.0003       Age of arrival 0 0.8777 0.8777 O O O 
4. Discussion  
The present study conducted an experiment based on the method of selecting objective QIs for 
CRDW. Even though 137 clinical data set columns were selected (Table 5) based on the QI 
selection method of the HIPAA rules, the present investigation was able to reduce the range of 
columns to 17 - 28 by using the objective QI selection method proposed in the present study. 
If the current QI selection method is used, more than 100 columns are selected as QIs, 
processed for de-identification, and consequently data utility drops. However, data utility may 
improve if limited number of columns that have re-identifiability are selected using uniqueness 
and influence values and the columns that do not have re-identifiability are removed.  
 A flexible de-identification method was prepared by indexing and scoring information such as 
the re-identification capability of data users and their affiliated institutions. Based on the scores 
obtained, stricter selection of QIs was applied for users who had higher de-identifiability while 
selecting less number of QIs for the users whose de-identifiability was low despite using 
identical data. 
 Even though the de-identification intent of users and institutions was objectively scored, there 
is, however, the possibility of users with low scores and less amount of de-identified data 
misusing information compared to the users with high scores if they have the intention to do 
so.[28] Therefore, an honest broker is needed for using the objective QI selection method 
proposed in the present study. The users who were graded using the method proposed for 
assessing user’s re-identification intent must undergo not only the intervention by the honest 
broker but also check the usage log of the provided data. Furthermore, there are occasions 
wherein users need data with minimum level de-identification depending on the research 
purpose. The honest broker should flexibly provide the level of de-identification by relatively 
decreasing re-identifiability by strengthening the de-identification measures of other QIs.  
The columns of clinical data set have diverse information, and application of the proposed 
selection method to all research data is limited. Accordingly, the present study proposed a 
method for extracting QIs from data and selecting QIs to be minimally used based on clinical 
data sets. The study offered a method to select QIs based on objective grounds rather than the 
experience and subjective judgments of researchers by preparing objective indices for selecting 
the final QIs by numerically calculating the uniqueness and influence of the selected QI data. 
Through the method, it is expected that researchers can not only protect research data from data 
linkage attacks that identify specific individuals by linking QIs with external data but also 
prevent disturbances to research by minimizing the data loss that occurs in the process of de-
identification. The de-identification method for the finally selected QIs should make the 
unnecessary information in the information searched for research purpose unsearchable. In the 
case of information needed for research purpose, however, the information should be excluded 
from de-identification for use while strengthening de-identification of other data. In future 
research, an in-depth investigation can focus on the existing de-identification method, security, 
and efficiency to strengthen it further through differentiating the level of de-identification by 
weighting the finally selected QIs in the present study. 
 
Summary points 
· With the vast amounts of data handled in clinical settings, de-identifying data appropriately 
in a manner that retains data utility while also protecting personal information is essential.  
· The present study proposed a method for extracting Quasi Identifiers (QIs) from data and 
selecting QIs to be minimally used based on clinical data sets.  
· The study offered a method to select QIs based on objective grounds rather than the 
experience and subjective judgments of researchers by preparing objective indices for 
selecting the final QIs by numerically calculating the uniqueness and influence of the 
selected QI data.  
· The proposed methodology can minimize the danger of information leakage when used for 
research by identifying connections in data based on the risk of exposing information when 
data is collated and minimize data loss through de-identification processes. 
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